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Taylor New Top Military Adviser

By Neal Stanford
Staff Correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

"The Uncertain Trumpet" suddenly has become the most-sought-after book in Washington.

Reason: Its author, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, former Army Chief of Staff who retired in 1959 will be back in the White House as of July 1 as "military representative of the President." General Taylor had differences with the Eisenhower administration over military strategy and organization.

That General Taylor's appointment as the President's adviser on military matters was coming was widely known.

Move Anticipated

His views on the need to increase limited war capabilities to accept the limitations of atomic retaliatory forces, to modernize the atomic deterrent, have been spelled out in his book and are more or less those accepted and advanced by President Kennedy.

When he recently was named to conduct a special survey of American intelligence in the wake of the ill-fated Cuban invasion that required examination of the roles and activities of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency, it was widely assumed he would wind up shortly with a White House post.

The White House announcement of the Taylor appointment makes clear just what General Taylor's new job will be—and won't be.

Berlin Task Looms

He will be:

1. Adviser and assistant to the President on military matters.
2. The President's senior military representative at home or abroad.
3. Watchdog of the government's intelligence apparatus.

He will not be:

1. A latter-day Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, who was Chief of Staff to both Presidents Roosevelt and Truman.
2. The President's alter ego, interposed between the President and any of his statutory advisers or advisory bodies (Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Council).
3. A one-man superintelligence agency.

General Taylor's first assignment, it is understood, will be to review the planning being done concerning Berlin and to submit his opinions and recommendations to the President.

General Taylor was Army Chief of Staff under President Eisenhower from 1955 to 1959. From late 1959 to late 1960 he was chairman of the board of the Mexican Light and Power Company. Since January, 1961, he has been president of the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts in New York City.

Multilinguist

General Taylor has a fluent command of the French and Spanish languages. He also learned Japanese while attached to the United States Embassy in Tokyo in the mid-1930's, Chinese while in Peking, Portuguese while in South America, German while commander in Berlin, and Korean while head of the United Nations forces during the Korean war.

General Taylor's appointment as senior military adviser to the President is no reflection on the present military chiefs in the Pentagon or on the current director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

But it is no secret that President Kennedy was less than enthusiastic about the turn of events in Cuba, events about which he relied heavily on the JCS and the CIA for advice and information.

In Key Group

General Taylor now joins that exclusive group of White House confidants that includes: McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to the President on national security affairs; Walt W. Rostow, deputy to Mr. Bundy; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., historian and Harvard professor. It is a group in which he will feel at home.

It is, of course, more than likely that as military adviser to the President he may not advocate the same programs outlined in his book, "The Uncertain Trumpet." Nonetheless, his views expressed therein are being widely studied as an indication of what he shortly may be discussing or recommending to the President.

And these include some highly provocative matters.

He has called for a crash program for the Nike-Zeus anti-ballistic missile, which Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara has viewed with much skepticism.

But possibly the issue on which he is most quoted, and apparently the cause for his retirement, was that of limited war requirements. He openly and strongly advocated greater preparation for limited conventional warfare, as contrasted with what he called "the great fallacy that massive retaliation is an all-weather, all-purpose strategy which is adequate to the military challenge."

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